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When I was a graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania in the late 1960s, 
philosopher Paul Weiss (1969) published his ground-breaking book, Sport, A 
Philosophic Inquiry. I distinctly remember a review of the book from The New York 
Times being posted on the graduate student bulletin board under a sign with very 
large letters that said, “Write on this subject only if you already have tenure.”
In retrospect, the attitude expressed by the sign conveyed a narrowness that 
characterized a good deal of the academic philosophy of the time. After all, sport 
was an important part of the culture, surely worthy of study, and involved interesting 
philosophical issues ranging from the conceptual, such as analysis of the nature of 
sport, to the ethical, such as the proper role of athletics in colleges and universities. 
It has been heartening to see more and more scholars become engaged with issues 
raised by sports and now helping to launch a project, initiated by the NCAA, to 
rigorously study intercollegiate athletics.
The existentialist philosopher Albert Camus once remarked that the context 
in which he really learned ethics was that of sport (Camus, 1960). Even if Camus 
learned valuable moral lessons from sport, it doesn’t follow that intercollegiate 
athletics is, can be, or should be a medium for moral education. Indeed, some 
critics will argue for the moral bankruptcy of intercollegiate athletics, citing such 
examples as academic fraud in one major basketball program, falsification of aca-
demic records to insure eligibility for an athlete at another, misbehavior including 
alleged criminal acts by some recruited athletes, and dismal graduation rates in 
some high visibility men’s programs. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that 
intercollegiate sports occur at a wide variety of institutions, ranging over different 
divisions and different educational missions. The problems of some high-profile 
Division I programs, particularly in men’s high-visibility sports, are not always 
typical of the wide variety of intercollegiate programs found across the nation.
My remarks will have three main goals. First, I will argue that a reasonable 
case can be made that in some contexts, intercollegiate athletics and academics not 
only do not conflict but may be mutually reinforcing. Second, I will suggest that 
some of the criticisms of such a view are at best indecisive and in some cases rest 
on highly debatable assumptions that may well apply to some areas of intercol-
legiate sports but probably not to all. Third, in discussing these critiques, I attempt 
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to identify further research that needs to be done to allow for a fuller assessment of 
the relationship of academics to intercollegiate athletics. Along the way, I will try 
to disentangle and identify the sometimes unacknowledged normative assumptions 
that also underlie much of the discussion.
Athletics as a Mutual Quest 
for Excellence Through Challenge
Let me begin by considering how intercollegiate athletics, in at least some of its 
manifestations, might contribute to the educational and moral growth of partici-
pants. Of course, many observers are sceptical about whether athletic competition 
has any value whatsoever in practice, or even in theory. However, a number of 
writers on ethics have developed similar views on not only what presuppositions 
must be satisfied to promote athletic competition that is ethical but that also might 
promote opportunities for education and moral growth. Competitive sports, on such 
a view, are governed by constitutive rules that create challenges to the participants, 
challenges that, when well designed, test the physical and mental qualities of the 
competitors (Suits, 1973).1 Athletic competition, when conceived of in this way, 
is not only ethically defensible but often admirable when entry into the contest is 
freely chosen, when opponents are viewed as facilitators with certain rights and 
duties rather than as mere obstacles to be beaten down, and when respect is shown 
to the values inherent in the game.2
The most important implication of this conception for our purposes is that 
athletic competition, when it fits or resembles this model, incorporates values that 
parallel and can reinforce primary academic values. On this view, engagement in 
athletic competition encourages the development of certain moral and educational 
virtues among competitors and also illustrates and reveals them to a wider audi-
ence. A different line of argument, defended recently by Myles Brand, argues that 
athletic contests are relevantly similar to such performances in the arts as dance 
and musical recitals that already are regarded as academic (Brand, 2006). 
For example, success at athletic competition conceived of in this way requires 
dedication and commitment, intellectual honesty about one’s strengths and weak-
nesses and those of opponents, willingness to accept failure and learn from mistakes, 
respect for the deepest values of the sport in question, and acknowledgment and 
conformity to norms of fair competition. Moreover, as Drew Hyland and others 
have maintained, athletic competition has a kind of critical dialogic structure 
where opponents decide how to react to each other’s actions and strategic decisions 
and afterward subject such choices to critical scrutiny. In the process, they have 
opportunities to gain self-knowledge about their capacities and character includ-
ing their ability to learn from mistakes and consequently improve and develop 
(Hyland, 1984).
If this view has force, it supports the idea that academic values and athletic 
ones can be mutually reinforcing. While it may best fit many Division III and other 
nonscholarship institutions, such as those of the Ivy League, that maintain that 
their athletics program has significant educational components, it also may have 
value for any educational institution that is attempting to better integrate athletics 
and academics.
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Let us call the claim that the values of intercollegiate athletics, properly 
conducted, can harmonize with and support sound academic and moral values the 
Mutual Reinforcement Thesis. This thesis can be understood in a variety of ways. 
For example, it might be making a causal claim that participation in athletics leads 
to moral and academic growth on the part of participants or perhaps some wider 
group, such as spectators. However, it also can be understood as making different 
sorts of claims. For example, the thesis might be understood educationally, in that 
athletic competition may be held to reveal or illustrate and express values that are 
important in academics as well, such as the value of working together with dif-
ferent sorts of people, and of dedication and commitment. Additionally, the thesis 
can function critically by providing standards of evaluation that can be applied to 
academics and athletics.
Thus, the example of a team playing well below its potential because of the 
selfishness of its players, or because of ideological or ethnic splits among them, 
may reveal and illustrate the dangers of allowing such differences to undermine 
common goals as well as provide grounds for criticizing the inability of the play-
ers to set aside differences for a common cause. A similar point can be applied to 
ideological differences in academic debate that result in each side demonizing the 
other, thus undermining the common goal of intellectual discourse and reasoned 
dialog. (The point, of course, is not that all differences should be papered over in 
the name of teamwork but rather that failure to deal reasonably with difference 
often will have unacceptable costs.) Or a professor might point out to student-
athletes that their ability to respond to criticism and learn from their mistakes on 
the field also would pay dividends if they reacted similarly to criticism from their 
classroom instructors.   
However, the Mutual Reinforcement Thesis is open to criticism from a vari-
ety of quarters. By examining some of these criticisms, perhaps we not only can 
come to a reasonable assessment of the thesis but also identify issues that need to 
be clarified by further inquiry in areas where both normative and empirical issues 
are interrelated.
Three Criticisms of Mutual Reinforcement
1) College Athletics Undermines Critical Thinking
According to the first sort of criticism I will examine, intercollegiate athletics does 
not in fact teach values that reinforce or cohere well with central academic values. 
According to proponents of this view, whatever is the case in theory, participation 
in intercollegiate athletics undermines rather than reinforces critical thinking.
Thus, Peter French, in his recent book Ethics and College Sports (2004), has 
argued that dominance by often authoritarian coaches tends to produce athletes who 
do not think for themselves but who learn simply to obey commands of their coaches 
and follow strategies the coaches lay down in advance. French cites intercollegiate 
football as an example of a sport “where every play and virtually every move of 
every player is directed by the head coach and a vast array of assistant coaches 
for every aspect of the game. Players, at best, are learning to follow orders and, I 
suspect, the consequences of not doing so” (French, p. 52). In other words, in the 
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actual world of intercollegiate athletics, players are trained to suppress critical or 
strategic thinking rather than engage in it.
However, while some coaches may fit French’s account, he provides little if any 
support for the claim that “very few” take seriously their role as moral model. His 
description of coaching may seem to fit football best, but even here questions can 
be raised. French sees coaches as replacing the players’ autonomy by taking over 
the game and calling all the plays. However, football arguably involves constant 
decisions by players even in the most controlled offense. Football coaches I have 
talked with about this topic all mention the ability to make good decisions under 
pressure as among the most important assets a player can have. Of course, different 
football coaches may have very different styles of teaching and actual practices 
may vary between the athletically elite football institutions and small liberal arts 
colleges in Division III of the NCAA. In addition, more strategic decision making 
may be called for at some positions than others. Nevertheless, I suspect French’s 
picture of the football coach is significantly overdrawn. Further research, however, 
would surely shed light on how many head football coaches stress good decision 
making on the field, as well as how many give their players opportunities to exercise 
their own strategic skills, including encouraging input by players into decisions 
about team strategies.
If the picture of the coach presented by French is questionable when applied to 
football, it can be made to fit other sports only with even greater difficulty. Individual 
sports, as I believe French would acknowledge, such as tennis, golf, and squash 
require constant decision making by the player. Basketball, although a team sport, 
requires players to recognize defenses, see and quickly exploit weaknesses in the 
play of opponents, and make the best responses appropriate to specific game situa-
tions. Similar points can be made about other team sports such as soccer, lacrosse, 
and softball. Surely, one of the most important and satisfying tasks of the coach in 
such sports is to teach players how to think about the strategy of the game and to 
make appropriate decisions given the context in the athletic contest.
Moreover, the issues raised by French’s comments go beyond the empirical. 
How much authority should the coach have? Indeed, we might wonder whether 
any sharp contrast between the supposedly authoritarian coach and the autonomy-
minded faculty can be justified. Faculty use their authority to select texts, pick 
subjects for discussion, and organize their courses often without student input 
but are not regarded as authoritarian. Some faculty, a small minority I hope, are 
caustic and sometimes demeaning to students and advisees. Although coaches 
may sometimes get angry at players, and sometimes cross the line of what should 
be tolerated, often this behavior could be because they, like other good teachers, 
simply want their athletes to develop their potential to the fullest.
Thus, although French’s criticism might be justified in particular contexts, 
we should question the view that intercollegiate athletics as a whole discourages 
or does not involve critical thinking. Further work needs to be done both to find 
out what coaches actually do, whether what they do varies by sport or divisional 
affiliation or philosophy of the institution, and normatively to explore what degree 
of strategic autonomy should be ceded to players and what the role of the coach as 
decision maker should be. For example, it normally is unreasonable to require a 
democratic vote during a time out in the closing seconds of a tied basketball game 
as to what play the team should run. In special cases, however, things might be 
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different; consider the championship game in the movie Hoosiers when the coach, 
played by Gene Hackman, changes his own strategy and follows the suggestion of 
his players in designing the final game winning play.
2) Intercollegiate Athletics and Moral and Cognitive 
Development
French also raises another kind of objection, directed specifically at the idea that 
intercollegiate athletes provides a kind of moral education promoting such values 
as fair play and respect for the opponent. According to this line of argument, and 
contrary to the causal version of Mutual Reinforcement, college athletes do not 
internalize the kinds of values in sport that might reinforce parallel values in aca-
demic or ethical thinking. As he points out, this objection can take two forms, and 
I would add a third version as well.
The first version simply denies that athletes generally develop morally as 
a result of their participation in athletics. In more extreme forms, this version 
maintains that, in fact, sport might hinder moral development or even promote 
bad character and moral regression rather than growth. The work of a number of 
investigators on the effect of sport on moral development might be cited in support 
of such skepticism, for example, the work of Jennifer Beller and Sharon Stoll, and 
David Shields and Brenda Jo Bredemeier. Stoll and Beller claim, for example,
Nonathletes use a significantly more principled and less calloused approach 
to addressing moral issues both in the sports arena and in societal con-
texts . . . Forty years of research, conducted by more than 20 researchers 
studying tens of thousands of athletes and non-athletes from youth, high 
schools, collegiate and Olympic levels, simply does not support the notion of 
sport as a character-building activity, particularly as it applies to sportsman-
ship behaviors and moral reasoning ability. (Stoll & Beller, 2000, as quoted 
in French, 2004, p. 54)
French himself expresses some sympathy for the idea that “there are certain morally 
good virtues and values in sports participation” but doubts whether they transfer to 
the behavior of athletes once they leave the playing field (French, p. 55).
The second version of the objection acknowledges that athletes might internal-
ize positive values through their participation in athletics but denies these values 
transfer to behavior off the playing field.
The third version also recognizes that athletes often exhibit positive values, 
such as the ability to work well with others or to respond well to criticism, and 
may bring some special benefits to their careers and communities after college, 
such as a capacity for teamwork and intensity and drive, but attributes all this to 
preselection. In other words, such qualities are a cause of success in athletics rather 
than a result.
Consider the first version of the claim that participation in competitive sport, 
particularly intercollegiate athletics, does not build character or contribute to 
moral or intellectual growth. While it certainly seems plausible to think that under 
some actual conditions participation in athletics can not only fail to promote the 
development of good character but also encourages bad behavior, questions can be 
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raised about whether the empirical research justifies broad generalizations about 
the role of sport and moral development. Before turning to such issues, however, it 
is important to distinguish the Mutual Reinforcement Thesis from the bald asser-
tion that participation in sport, including intercollegiate athletics, builds desirable 
moral character.
The Mutual Reinforcement Thesis (the thesis that academic and athletic 
values are or can be mutually reinforcing) is actually a family of related claims, 
only one of which is a causal thesis about the effects of intercollegiate athletics on 
participants. In addition, on noncausal interpretations, it might claim that athletic 
competition often reveals and expresses desirable values, that such values cohere 
well with academic values, and can serve as the basis for criticism of morally 
and educationally dubious practices in both athletics and in the classroom. Even 
in the causal version, proponents of mutual reinforcement should acknowledge 
that whether morally acceptable values are reinforced in athletics and whether 
they transfer to other areas depends on contextual factors, that is, on how sport 
is practiced in a specific setting. For example, star athletes may develop a sense 
of entitlement and privilege that leads them to regard themselves as exempt from 
ordinary standards of behavior. Too often, they end up acting in unacceptable ways, 
perhaps in part, because of the adulation they received as a result of their feats on 
the field of play.
We also need to distinguish the claim that participation in athletics promotes 
general moral growth, or ability at sophisticated moral reasoning, from the more 
restricted claim that it reinforces specific values, perhaps including those relevant 
to academics. For example, it is conceivable that participation in athletics in 
many contexts does not promote skill in abstract moral reasoning but does make 
participants more open to criticism and more willing to recognize and appreciate 
achievement by others than otherwise would be the case. Or, as James Q. Wilson 
recently has suggested, athletic teams are one of the relatively few associations 
in American society that often are successful in combing diversity with elements 
of “social capital” as trust and cooperation in pursuit of a common goal. Wilson 
makes this suggestion in his discussion of Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000)
and of Putnam’s more recent work on the possible conflict between the pursuit of 
diversity and social capital (Wilson, 2007). So even if participation in intercollegiate 
athletics does not promote general moral growth or sophisticated moral reasoning, 
it could have a narrow positive effect in supporting and revealing more specific 
values closely tied to meeting the challenges of competition in sport.
Having said that, the empirical research on the relationship of participation in 
athletics and moral development is important and deserves serious consideration. 
Much of it involves presenting respondents with moral issues or dilemmas and 
assessing their responses. I cannot survey that extensive literature here, but I will try 
to raise some philosophical concerns about its presuppositions that might suggest 
fruitful future lines of inquiry about athletics and moral development.
First, philosophers rightly will worry whether the different researchers in 
the area all have the same conception of moral development. Those who take a 
virtue-based approach might be looking for quite different things, for example, 
than those who adopt Kohlberg’s view of moral development as requiring skill 
in applying impartially justified abstract principles to moral dilemmas. In other 
words, different researchers might be investigating quite different issues, because 
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they mean different things by moral character or moral development. As a result, 
general conclusions about the effect of participation in athletics on moral growth 
may be difficult to draw.
A second and related point is that the researcher’s own theory of what is ethi-
cal may influence findings, and indeed sometimes may itself be controversial. For 
example, consider the following sample question from the Hahm-Beller Values 
Choice Inventory (HBVCI) used by Stoll and Beller (2000) in their investigations 
of moral development. In discussing this question, my point is not to undermine the 
research of which it is part, which probably couldn’t be done by considering only 
one question, but to indicate how scoring of responses can involve both empirical 
and evaluative elements that need to be disentangled, and hence, why the signifi-
cance of the results might be open to interpretation.
Certain basketball teams are coached to run plays that cause the opponents to 
foul. Players and coaches believe this is a clever strategy because the opponents 
may foul out of the game, giving their team an advantage. Because the coach 
orders this type of play, the players should follow his directions. (University 
of Idaho Center for Ethics, 2008)
I suggest, however, that just which response to this question is ethically justi-
fied is quite controversial. For example, although we should want to test ourselves 
in competitive athletics by matching our primary skills (the skills that are central 
to excellence in the sport such as dribbling, shooting, and passing the ball) against 
the best the opposition has to offer, strategic skills also are part of the test consti-
tuted by sport. Such skills, including knowing how to avoid fouling on defense, 
also are fundamental and help define what counts as meeting the test or challenge 
of the contest. In the latter view, the coaches’ decision is just good strategy and 
not morally controversial. Similarly, it is just good strategy in baseball when, with 
the game on the line, the manager sends in a left-handed relief pitcher to face the 
opposition’s best left-handed batter rather than sticking with his right-handed 
ace hurler. Part of the test of baseball is for hitters to be able to bat successfully 
against both right- and left-handed pitchers, or for a team to have enough depth to 
counter the pitching change with a skilled pinch-hitter. In other words, just what 
counts as bad sportsmanship in meeting the test of excellence can itself be morally 
controversial. Athletes who sometimes give what is considered the morally less 
mature or sensitive answer may have a plausible moral argument supporting their 
conclusion even if they do not always articulate it well. 
Critics might argue that even if my analysis of this question is correct, it may 
not be typical of questions on the HBVCI or other types of surveys used by different 
investigators. Perhaps so, although my discussion that follows of the obligation of 
athletes to report bad calls in their favor by officials suggests that at least some other 
sample questions also raise debatable issues. In any case, I suggest later in the paper 
that interdisciplinary discussion among interested ethicists, sports psychologists, 
and sociologists on issues raised in scoring test results is likely to be productive.
It might be replied that what is evaluated is not the answer to the question 
but the sophistication and cogency of the moral reasoning supplied in its defense. 
For example, the question may be designed to investigate whether athletes blindly 
follow morally controversial instructions from a coach. If the justification for the 
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strategy sketched above is at all cogent, however, athletes may have no good reason 
to regard the proposed strategy as morally questionable in the first place.
Moreover, at least some ethicists will have doubts as to whether identification 
of more and less sophisticated forms of moral reasoning is itself controversial. For 
example, Kohlbergian cognitive psychologists tend to regard deontological reason-
ing from abstract universal principles that can be impartially upheld as perhaps 
the most sophisticated form of ethical reasoning. However, this would surely be 
contested, not only by sophisticated utilitarian theorists, but by virtue ethicists and 
proponents of an ethic of care who stress good judgment in concrete instances rather 
than abstract reasoning (for an earlier discussion that raises some similar points, 
see Gough, 1995).  Indeed, there may be a bias among investigators toward liberal 
political theorists such as Kant and Rawls. As a result, some researchers may give 
too little weight to social values such as teamwork and its contribution to commu-
nity, as well as the capacity to set aside differences and work with diverse others 
toward a common end. I would argue that the work of Kant and Rawls goes a long 
way toward defending the principles that are fundamental to the liberal democratic 
state but suggest that we should not thereby exclude the values of community and 
social association from our moral universe.
What about participation in intercollegiate athletics and moral responsibility? 
It is sometimes claimed that athletes tend to be morally calloused in the sense that 
they transfer the burden of moral decision making “from their shoulders to those 
of officials, the enforcers of the rules, and to coaches, whom the players learn to 
see as responsible for all decisions.” French remarks that “there is something eerily 
reminiscent of the famous Milgram experiments” in the deference shown by athletes 
to coaches and officials (French, 2004, p. 53).
But is this all too quick? In the Milgram experiments, subjects were asked to 
inflict apparent harm upon seemingly helpless people against their will while an 
athletic contest presumably is a voluntary activity conducted under conditions of 
rough equality of power. Officials are not ordering players to inflict harm on the 
helpless but are enforcing rules that all have implicitly agreed to follow. Second, 
it is doubtful if the conclusion applies to all sports. For example, individual sports 
such as golf do require players to make calls against themselves when they violate 
rules.
In addition, it may be difficult to decide just when athletes should attempt 
to substitute their own judgment for that of officials and coaches. Perhaps, to use 
an example used in the HBVCI, a volleyball player who touched a ball that the 
official incorrectly calls out should report to the official that she touched the ball. 
But things may not always be that simple. In basketball, a player may think she 
has fouled an opponent but perhaps the official has a different conception of what 
constitutes improper contact, or regards the contact as inconsequential (“no harm 
no foul”), or the player is not certain of what happened. If players constantly try to 
correct officials in such situations, they well might be disrespecting the official’s 
judgment and experience or,  simply, be viewed as trying to “show up” the referee. 
Indeed, it’s not even clear whether it is the individual beneficiary of the bad call 
who should unilaterally confess or whether teammates and coaches ought to be 
consulted as well.
 I’m sure we can think of particular cases where attempting to correct a bad 
call in our favor is morally appropriate or even required. However, the general 
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rule that players leave the officiating to officials may be the one athletes generally 
ought to follow, in part because they may not be very good at picking up the per-
haps few incidents where they ought to acknowledge a self-violation and in part 
because their own judgment often may be no more accurate than that of trained 
rules officials themselves. So while I myself do think that more attention ought 
to be given to the obligations of athletes to enforce the rules—maybe team sports 
should be more like golf— it isn’t easy to say what the principles that apply in this 
area should be. Without clear guidelines, athletes are not necessarily adopting a 
morally immature stance by leaving officiating to the officials, at least in the vast 
majority of instances.
This leads to another formulation of the view that participation in intercol-
legiate athletics fails to promote moral growth or education; namely, the idea that 
whatever values are promoted on the field do not transfer to activities away from 
it. On one version of this account, athletes bracket ordinary morality while on the 
playing field and adopt a separate set of moral rules peculiar to sport. One can 
tackle an opponent on the football field but not on the street after a game. So even 
if athletes learn something about some special sports morality through athletic 
competition, it is questionable if this transfers to growth in ordinary moral think-
ing or judgment.
This issue of bracketing ordinary morality in special contexts does raise 
complex issues but they are not restricted to sport. For example, college profes-
sors normally have the right to decide who can speak for how long during class, 
and even when to cut off discussion and resume a lecture, but they have no such 
right in many other areas. Does this promote a special morality of the classroom, 
in which students learn to defer to the authority of the professor, but which has no 
application in other contexts? Or does it promote respect for the broadly applicable 
principle that critical dialog must be structured to allow for a variety of reasonable 
voices to be heard?
In the absence of a convincing argument to the contrary, the common sense 
position that life is not divided into a multitude of totally separated compartments 
but rather that lessons learned in one area of endeavor often carry over to another 
is intuitively plausible. Thus, philosophy professors expect that their efforts to 
teach students to think logically might have some influence on the ability of their 
students to analyze various forms of argument outside of class.
I suggest, then, that the burden of proof should lie with those who question the 
transferability of values from one domain to another. Even if that point is mistaken, 
however, a second point may have even more force. That is, it is questionable 
whether a special morality of sport is totally separate from ordinary forms of moral 
thinking. For example, the convention in soccer that the team in possession of the 
ball should not take advantage of an opponent’s injury but instead should halt play 
by kicking the ball out of bounds surely reflects ordinary notions of fairness and is 
not some special part of an alien ethic applying only on the field of play.
In other cases, what looks like an instance of a special morality of sport may 
simply be the application of a more general universal moral principle to athletics.
In this regard, Brenda Jo Bredemeier and David Shields most recently have 
characterized moral maturity as involving balancing of common and mutual 
interests, in which each party considers the values and points of view of the 
others, in trying to reach harmony of or at least compromise of interests. (See, for 
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example, Bredemeier & Shields, 2001.) But, attractive as such a suggestion may 
be, we need to be careful about the level at which such reconciliation takes place. 
Is the level that of each individual action or the level of acceptance of the practice 
within which the acts take place? A hard tackle in football may at one level fail to 
equally advance the interest of all the players but may be acceptable morally, if at 
a more fundamental level all players have freely entered the game of football with 
the knowledge that hard tackles are part of the game. Robert Fullinwider (2006) 
makes a similar criticism of Bredemeier and Shields. We also need to keep in mind 
Brian Barry’s (1995) reminder in his defense of justice as impartial reasoning; 
namely, that justice as impartiality does not require we be impartial whenever we 
make a decision but that the general rules and principles under which we operate 
(that may sometimes allow us to be partial, for example, in paying special attention 
to our own children) be impartially acceptable to all.
Thus, to argue that athletes tend more often than nonathletes to bracket ordinary 
moral principles by egoistically putting themselves or their team first may not give 
adequate weight to a higher level consensus among athletes that acknowledges such 
a focus as universally acceptable in the context of competitive athletics. While I 
agree that it is a sign of moral impoverishment if athletes view athletic competi-
tion merely as a kind of Hobbesian war of all against all, a focus on winning and 
on one’s own team’s competitive success need not be an expression of such a 
Hobbesian view. Might it not instead sometimes be a reflection of a higher order 
agreement imposing obligations on all to play to win so that each participant or 
team can be rigorously tested in intense competition? If so, it is likely that in at 
least some cases, context-dependent moral principles that apply in sport may be 
justifiable by appeal to more general context-independent principles that apply 
across the board to moral thinking.
The transferability objection then faces two key criticisms; that the degree of 
separation between areas of human endeavor that it assumes is questionable, and 
that the separate morality of sports it postulates is not so separate after all.
Finally, what about the third version of the objection based upon preselec-
tion? According to the preselection argument, athletes may indeed possess certain 
virtues, such as drive, ability to cooperate with others, and the capacity to learn 
from failure and from criticism, but this is not the result of their participation in 
athletics. Rather, it is among the causes of their success as athletes (Shulman & 
Bowen, 2001, p. 97).
In assessing this argument, note that if sound, it applies to far more than athlet-
ics. For example, why assume the education provided by more selective colleges 
and universities has any major effect on students? After all, those institutions select 
through the admission process the very students who have already demonstrated 
their ability to succeed in the classroom. So if preselection applies to athletics, why 
not to academics as well?
I suggest that on the contrary, in the absence of a convincing argument for 
preselection, the common sense position I will sketch is the default position that 
applies in both areas. According to this position, admissions officers and athletic 
recruiters each endeavor to select candidates who have demonstrated they possess 
the virtues needed for success in their respective areas. However, both the academic 
and athletic experiences of such individuals in college contribute to their develop-
ment in both areas by building upon and enhancing skills and capacities they already 
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possess. Indeed, some develop significantly in each area. Thus, until we are given 
not just a theory but a compelling argument that preselection is virtually the whole 
story, we should resist the claim that the college experience adds nothing to what 
students, athletes or not, already bring to the table upon entering college.
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that a number of researchers 
in this area refrain from making broad generalizations about the effects of partici-
pation in intercollegiate athletics on cognitive and moral development. In their 
recent work, for example, Bredemeier and Shields recognize the complexity of the 
issues they discuss. Thus, in one recent article, while they report that in comparing 
a sample of college basketball players to nonathletes (the moral reasoning of the 
nonathletes was significantly more mature than was that of the athletes), they also 
note that the moral reasoning of females about sport was more mature than that 
of males. To complicate things still further, when intercollegiate swimmers were 
added to the study, the moral maturity of swimmers and nonathletes did not differ 
(Bredemeier & Shields, 2001).
Perhaps because of such diverse results, Bredemeier and Shields (and I think 
Stoll and Beller would agree) acknowledge that the so-called moral maturity of 
athletes may differ according to all sorts of variables, including gender, whether 
sports are individual or team oriented, and perhaps the philosophy of the coach and 
institution, and maybe even the divisional level of the NCAA in which the sport is 
played. Indeed, Bredemeier and Shields conclude, sensibly in my view, that “gen-
eralizations about sport involvement and moral character are not warranted” and, 
in another venue, that “the influence that sport has for its participants depends on a 
complex set of factors tied to the specific sport, and the social interactions that are 
present (Bredemeier & Shields, 2001, p. 7; see also Bredemeier & Shields, 1995, 
p. 195). Thus, as I think Beller and Stoll also would agree, how well academic 
institutions integrate athletics and academics may have a significant effect on the 
educational and social benefits athletes derive from their experience in intercol-
legiate athletics.
To summarize this section, many of the studies of the effects of participation 
in athletics on moral and intellectual development raise disturbing questions for 
advocates of Mutual Reinforcement. However, such studies may often rest on 
assumptions that are themselves moral in character and which may sometimes 
be controversial in their own right.3 Thus, the extent to which research on moral 
development of athletes is purely empirical is debatable. This entanglement of the 
empirical and the normative constitutes an area where social scientists and ethi-
cists can each contribute to identify and resolve problems that are neither entirely 
factual nor entirely evaluative and that provide fertile ground for interdisciplinary 
investigation.
3) Athletes and Academic Performance at Selective 
Institutions4
A third line of criticism challenges mutual reinforcement by arguing that at 
selective colleges and universities, including liberal arts colleges where athletes 
can make up as much as 30–40% of the student population, declining academic 
performance by student-athletes negatively affects the entire academic climate of 
the institution. This has been argued by James L. Shulman and William G. Bowen 
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in the influential book, The Game of Life (2001), and more recently by Bowen 
and Sarah A. Levin in its sequel, Reclaiming the Game (2003), which focuses 
especially on the New England Small College Athletic Conference (NESCAC), 
to which my home institution, Hamilton College, belongs, and on the University 
Athletic Association (UAA).
These books do not directly contradict the thesis that academic and athletic 
values can be mutually reinforcing. In fact the authors sometimes lament the 
decline in academic performance of student-athletes from the 1950s and 60s when 
they equaled or outperformed nonathletes academically at the institutions in the 
study. However, the argument of the books is that even at the most selective liberal 
arts institutions that claim to integrate athletics and academics, a significant and 
growing proportion of more recent cohorts of student-athletes have not internal-
ized academic values and may subordinate academic achievement to achievement 
of goals in athletics. Although the majority of institutions in the study are highly 
selective and may not be representative of higher education generally, these stud-
ies are important because one might argue that if intercollegiate athletics as we 
know it does not harmonize with academics at such schools, harmonization cannot 
reasonably be expected anywhere else.
The argument of these books is largely statistical, drawing on an extensive 
database involving cohorts of graduates from the highly selective schools in the 
sample. The institutions covered in the studies include liberal arts colleges such 
as Williams, Swarthmore, Denison, and Hamilton, as well as several Ivy League 
schools and a number of academically respected but athletically elite universities 
such as Duke, Washington University, and Penn State. The same database also 
was the foundation for another widely cited study, The Shape of the River (Bowen 
& Bok, 2000) in which Bowen and former Harvard President Derek Bok defend 
affirmative action admissions programs by reporting on the social contributions of 
alumni beneficiaries of such admission policies.
While my concern is not primarily with the statistical analysis in The Game of 
Life, I do find the statistical argument intriguing but also less than conclusive. This 
is because of questions the study leaves unresolved which, if examined further, 
might yield data that at least would soften the study’s rather harsh evaluation of 
the academic performance of athletes. Perhaps some examples will illustrate my 
concern.
Thus, to get a true picture of the effect of athletics on academics, don’t we 
need to count the excellent students who would not have attended an institution if 
not for its athletic program, as well as recruited athletes who perform poorly in the 
classroom? Unfortunately, The Game of Life does not consider in depth whether 
outstanding students (athletes and nonathletes alike) might be attracted to an insti-
tution because of its athletic program, either because they enjoy involvement in 
athletics even as spectators or because athletics has enhanced the overall visibility 
of the institution they attend. This was brought home to me in a seminar a few years 
ago when, after I had described the thesis of The Game of Life, a female three-sport 
athlete and absolutely outstanding student remarked, “I never would have come 
here if I hadn’t been a recruited student-athlete.” Moreover, the evidence here is 
not merely anecdotal. For example, a self-study at my own institution indicates 
that recruited athletes, even in high profile male sports, are very well represented 
among those receiving academic awards at graduation and that “female recruited 
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athletes had, by a significant amount, the largest percentage of summa cum laude 
graduates than any group” (From “Athletes and Academic Performance,” a sum-
mary report prepared at Hamilton College in 2004 and quoted with permission of 
the College.)
To cite just one more concern with the book’s statistical argument, perhaps 
many athletes, who come to college with the idea that they are there primarily to 
play sports, do poorly at first and, as a result, end up with worse overall records than 
students at large. However, many such student-athletes may mature intellectually 
during their college years and end up working at a similar level to other students 
by the time they graduate. Perhaps in some cases the qualities of discipline and 
hard work they acquired through athletics, and the encouragement of their coaches, 
have contributed to such gains. An issue that calls for further investigation, then, 
is whether the academic performance of student-athletes improves as they become 
juniors and seniors, so that even if their overall class rank remains lower than that 
of their peers, the differences become less and less and perhaps even vanish over 
time.
Remember also that even according to The Game of Life, female athletes 
perform about as well academically as other female students, a significant number 
of teams at many of the institutions studied do as well or nearly as well in the 
classroom as other students, and athletes graduate at as high or higher rate than 
students at large. Hence, the picture of the academic performance of athletes at 
the institutions studied is far from all bleak, a point that might be lost if only the 
negative findings of the book are emphasized.
Perhaps of greater interest in this forum than debates about the interpretation 
of statistics are questions both about the explanation Bowen and Shulman provide 
for their conclusions and about whether they have correctly assessed the value of 
athletic programs at the schools in their study.
What explains the alleged weak performance of male student-athletes at 
institutions examined in The Game of Life? Bowen and Shulman attribute much 
of the fault to what they call a “culture of sports” (Shulman & Bowen, 2001) 
pp. 74–86).While this culture is not precisely defined, it involves a tendency to 
socialize mainly with other athletes, pursue certain majors in proportions differ-
ent from the rest of the student population, accept more conservative values than 
other students, and be more focused on financial success after college than other 
students. This culture of athletics has been fostered by the early specialization of 
youngsters into particular sports, recruiting policies by admissions officers that 
reward such specialization (the search for a well-rounded class rather than well-
rounded individuals), and consequent estrangement of athletes from the academic 
mission of their institutions.
This hypothesis is not implausible if presented as a partial explanation. But is 
this explanation likely to be the whole story? Before we come to any firm conclu-
sions, don’t other possible explanations also need to be considered? For example, 
do faculties that arguably have increasingly become less and less involved with 
student life exhibit an increasing indifference or insensitivity to or, in more extreme 
cases, even disdain for the athletic involvement of students? Does this in turn 
reinforce withdrawal by athletes into their own culture? Shulman and Bowen have 
found that athletes with faculty mentors outperform other athletes academically 
(2001, pp. 71–74), but do such attitudes, to the extent they are in fact exhibited, 
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create obstacles to the development of such a relationship? To their credit, Shulman 
and Bowen briefly consider the possibility of faculty disdain for athletes or even 
prejudice against athletes as a possible explanation for the alleged poor academic 
performance of student-athletes but acknowledge they have no way to analyze pos-
sible effects statistically. I myself seriously doubt if very many faculty, whatever 
their personal feelings about athletics, actually grade athletes unfairly. What may 
be more likely, however, is that some faculty express a kind of insensitivity or even 
hostility to athletics that may discourage student-athletes from coming to them for 
help at the first sign of academic trouble. For example, an athlete who, because 
of a conflict with a scheduled contest, misses a class with a professor regarded as 
unsympathetic to athletics may be more hesitant than other students to go to that 
faculty member for help, perhaps especially if the student-athlete is the first family 
member to attend a university and, as a first year student, feels less comfortable 
with faculty than other students who are more at ease in an academic climate.
In the later work, Reclaiming the Game, Bowen and his coauthor Sarah A. 
Levin consider at somewhat more length a different alternative hypothesis, what 
they call “stereotype threat.” According to Stanford psychologist Claude Steele 
who originally proposed the idea, “Members of certain minority groups are prone 
to under-perform academically because of an unconscious fear of living up to 
negative group stereotypes” (as quoted in Bowen & Levin, 2003, p. 235). Bowen 
and Levin acknowledge that “stereotyping [of athletes] can be real and it may well 
take a toll academically” (Bowen & Levin, p. 235) but again acknowledge they 
have no way of assessing its impact.
The point of Steele’s theory is that the stereotyping may be internal, coming 
from the athletes themselves. So just as a golfer who visualizes a bad outcome to 
a shot may hit the water hazard instead of the green, athletes who doubt them-
selves academically also may under-perform as a result. Hence, the hypothesis of 
stereotype threat by athletes themselves is separate from the alternate hypothesis 
that faculty attitudes toward athletics can affect the academic performance of 
student-athletes.
A third alternative hypothesis to the culture of athletics is that other institutional 
factors have a significant effect on the academic performance of student-athletes. 
For example practices and games may conflict with review sessions, presentations 
by visiting lecturers, study group meetings, and other course-related activities. 
Similarly, if instructors schedule office hours at times that practices usually are 
scheduled, athletes may have fewer opportunities to come for help than other stu-
dents. In such cases, more thought by the faculty member and better communica-
tion with coaches may be helpful. In my experiences at a Division III institution, 
coaches I have contacted will often either rearrange their practice schedule or excuse 
a student-athlete from practice if contacted well in advance and the conflicting 
academic obligation is significant.
It is important to sort out and assess these different potential explanations, 
as well as other possible accounts, since each may suggest different strategies 
for improving the academic performance of athletes. Moreover, these different 
hypotheses are not incompatible but may all play some explanatory role. One 
way of assessing their relative merits might involve investigating how well each 
explains the alleged differences in academic performances between male and 
female athletes, as well as those between teams and among individual teammates. 
54  Simon
Thus, a hypothesis that assigns significant explanatory power to faculty attitudes 
toward athletics might need to postulate a perhaps implausible degree of difference 
in faculty treatment of female and male athletes. But equally, those who stress the 
explanatory force of the culture of athletics would need to explain why that culture 
is stronger among teams that perform poorly academically than among teams that 
perform well, and why many male athletes, even in high profile sports where that 
culture may be presumed to be strongest, do so well academically. In addition, 
some independent way to measure the degree of strength of the culture in different 
contexts is needed so we could establish a correlation between cultural influence 
and academic performance in the first place. Without an independent test, we would 
be explaining poor performance by appeal to a culture of athletics but our only 
evidence that it was present would be the poor performance itself.
 In any case, even if the culture of athletics does play an important role in 
explaining the academic performance gap between student-athletes and other 
students at the institutions studied, other factors may be at least equally important 
or may exacerbate its effects significantly. If so, attributing the gap largely to 
the attitudes, practices, and “culture” of the student-athletes themselves may be 
unwarranted.
It also is important to note that not all aspects of the culture of athletes, as 
described by Bowen and Shulman, are negative, although my reading of the book 
suggests that they are given a negative spin by the authors. Why, for example, is it 
a bad thing if student-athletes have more conservative values than other students? 
Indeed, the latter can be viewed as a contribution to intellectual diversity and 
might well enliven classroom discussion if instructors teaching courses involving 
political and social analysis encouraged more conservative students to defend their 
positions in class.
The significance of this for the mutual reinforcement of academics and athlet-
ics is that, if there is a significant gap in academic performance between (male) 
student-athletes and students at large, institutional changes designed to enhance 
the academic opportunities for athletes, including relatively manageable factors 
such as giving more consideration to athletic schedules when posting office hours 
or holding review sessions, may well improve the situation.
My last question about The Game of Life concerns whether it correctly assesses 
the value of intercollegiate athletics as part of the educational process itself. There 
is remarkably little discussion of such questions in The Game of Life. While atten-
tion is paid to the question of whether athletes contribute more to society than 
nonathletes after graduation, the issue is framed largely in quantitative terms, 
involving such questions as comparison of earnings and the success of athletes vs. 
nonathletes at becoming CEOs.
While such questions are of interest, they do not speak to the question of whether 
the experiences of athletes on the playing field, and perhaps those of spectators, are 
of educational value. Do athletes sometimes learn something about themselves or 
others in trying to meet the challenges of their sport? Does athletics sometimes reveal 
or illustrate something of value to a wider audience? Does athletics sometimes play 
a role on campus in building community or illustrating the compatibility of diversity 
and social union? Thus, if some versions of the Mutual Reinforcement Thesis are 
correct, or apply to significant segments of intercollegiate athletics, college sports 
provide kinds of benefits not considered in The Game of Life.
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So although The Game of Life raises issues that should be of concern to those 
involved in athletics and higher education, its arguments, while clear and thoughtful, 
are not conclusive. As with any work of substance, it raises further questions that 
might be explored most fruitfully by both ethicists concerned with sport and social 
scientists. My own tentative conclusion is that while the conclusions of the book 
are worrisome and must be taken seriously, they also present too harsh a picture 
of intercollegiate athletics at many of the institutions studied.
Conclusions and Suggestions
So what has our discussion suggested about the value of intercollegiate athletics 
and its compatibility with academic values? Given the diversity of intercollegiate 
athletic programs and the problems faced at different levels of competition, broad 
generalizations probably should be avoided. The issues that arise at many of the 
institutions studied in The Game of Life differ significantly from those facing athletic 
programs at many large, athletically elite Division I institutions.
In any case, my goal has not been to say everything is fine in intercollegiate 
athletics. However, I have tried to argue, first, that the picture is far from all bleak 
and that some of the arguments about the incompatibility of intercollegiate athletics 
and academic and moral development are not conclusive. Second, I have suggested 
areas of further research, of the kind that I hope the NCAA Colloquia can encourage, 
that would help clarify points at issue and perhaps resolve reasonable disagreement 
in this area. Among these are the extent to which coaches do and should encourage 
or promote critical thinking among their players, the degree to which evaluations of 
the moral maturity of athletes may themselves reflect controversial moral assump-
tions of the investigators, and the extent to which institutional factors other than the 
culture of athletics inhibit academic performance by student-athletes. In many of 
these areas, collaborative work or at least greater communication between social 
scientists and ethicists can contribute to better understanding of these issues.
I also have suggested that a case can be made that values implicit in properly 
run athletic programs are compatible with and can even reinforce values central 
to academic inquiry. Moreover, I have argued that some important criticisms of 
this view are not decisive. While each critical point may have force in particular 
contexts or at some institutions, it is far from clear that they apply across the board 
to college athletics. If my discussion has force, then, it suggests there also may be 
much of value in many segments of intercollegiate athletics and much to be gained 
by focusing on better integration of athletics and academics.
Does the discussion suggest any concrete ways of promoting harmonization? 
For one thing, following up on the suggestion of Stoll and Beller that interventions 
can make a significant difference in the moral development of athletes, participants 
in intercollegiate athletics might be encouraged to reflect critically on their 
athletic experiences and the broader significance of athletics in our culture. This 
might involve formal course work, including the opportunity to take courses on 
the sociology, psychology, and philosophy of sport, or more informal but still 
structured exchanges with coaches and academic faculty. One example of such 
an existing program is the Madison Academic and Athletic Exchange (MAAX) 
Program at the University of Wisconsin (2008). As described by the University, 
MAAX is a curriculum-based service-learning initiative in civic engagement that 
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brings first-year University of Wisconsin students, including but not restricted 
to intercollegiate athletes, together with local high school student-athletes for a 
collaborative inquiry in an English composition course geared to investigating 
relationships between academics and athletics. I was fortunate enough to speak to 
these students in the spring of 2007 and was impressed by their engagement and 
reflection on issues of academics and athletics.
Other forums, both formal and informal, might encourage communication 
and perhaps better understanding between coaches and other faculty. For example, 
several years ago my institution supported a series of summer seminar sessions 
for faculty and coaches on The Game of Life that proved valuable not only for our 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the book, but also for bringing 
people from diverse areas of our institution together to discuss common concerns 
about intercollegiate athletics. Greater contact between coaches and faculty may 
not only promote better understanding of differing perspectives between both 
groups but also reduce stereotyping of each group by the other. Such exchanges 
can encourage coaches to internalize the academic values of their institution, even 
when they may hinder competitive success. Dialogue also may influence faculty 
who are uninterested in athletics to appreciate the educational value of athletics as 
well. J. Douglas Toma makes a similar point in “Share the Goal of Integration” in 
the NCAA News (Toma, 2007, p. 4ff).
Finally, faculty might be encouraged to play a more proactive role in mentoring 
student-athletes, particularly first-generation college students during their first two 
years at the institution, helping them to balance athletic and academic obligations in 
an appropriate manner and to make a full commitment to academic achievement.
In any case, if I am correct in arguing that a defensible ethic of intercollegiate 
athletic competition embodies many values that cohere with and are supportive 
of central academic values, whether at the causal, illustrative, or critical levels, 
college sports can be and perhaps often are a valuable aspect of the educational 
experience. I hope further research of the kind the NCAA Colloquia hopes to sup-
port can help assess whether such a thesis retains credibility after more extended 
critical examination.
Notes
1. The idea of defining games as activities where the constitutive rules create artificial obstacles 
to challenge us was most influentially developed by Bernard Suits whose informal definition 
of playing games (sports being games of physical skill) is “the voluntary attempt to overcome 
unnecessary obstacles” (Suits, as quoted in Morgan, 2007). Suits’s conceptual analysis has been 
a significant influence on later writers seeking to develop normative theories of sport, including 
my own work in my book, Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport (Simon, 2004), particularly Chapters 
2 and 3.
2. An example of this is the duty to play hard to create a challenge for competitors and the 
right to have competitors respect the rules and principles of the sport. This view also suggests 
that winning, while an important criterion of success since it ordinarily indicates who best 
meets the challenge of the competition, is not always such an indicator, as when an athletically 
superior team ekes out a sloppy victory over a vastly inferior opponent who played its best but 
fell just short of overcoming the superior athleticism of the winner. In such a contest, the loser 
may well have met the challenge of competition best by playing to its full potential, whereas the 
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winner’s play was marred by miscues, lack of effort at key points, and general sloppy execution 
throughout the contest.
3. For a reply to the view that research on moral development may make some moral assump-
tions of its own, see Sharon Stoll’s 1999 article in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport  “Should 
Character be Measured? A Reply to Professor Gough and the Reductionist Argument.” For a reply 
to Stoll, see M. Andrew Holowchak (2001), “Can Character be Measured? A Reply to Stoll’s 
Reply to Gough,” also in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport.
4. This section draws heavily upon and expands upon my review of The Game of Life that 
appeared in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XXIX in 2002.
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